In recent years, there has been considerable pressure on corporations doing business in South Africa to divest and withdraw from that country. While this moral view espouses withdrawal, this article seeks to provide insight into the practical consequences of divestment. One of the questions addressed is how does foreign divestment affect Black South Africans, those who are supposed to benefit from a divestment policy.
funds. Possibly the most dramatic single instance of training was Fluor Corporation's massive project in which more than 20 000 welders were trained on one site. As a result, many of these welders were able to set up welding and related businesses in their homelands and villages. Black entrepreneurship has increased about 700% since 1978, the first reporting year after the Sullivan Principles were adopted.
In other spheres, also, contributions have been made. The NCR Corporation has donated $2 million to the Urban Foundation to help fund various Black projects, including lobbying, research, self-help housing, adult education, and business development IBM, although sold to a South African organization, is still expanding its small builders loan scheme to Black towns. Michael Levin, Economist and Director of the Port Elizabeth Campus of the predominantly Black Vista University, indicates that foreign companies operating in the Eastern Cape province contributed 25% of the gross regional product in 1984. In addition, these organizations provided about 84% of the social welfare funds spent outside government budgets that year. 4 However, it still must be borne in mind that all these activities constitute a net total of only $1.50 per capital investment, of the total Black population. But at least that much is being done. As William D.
Broderick of Ford Motor Company noted, "The principles have clearly fallen short of the ideal, but the record is pretty impressive still." 5 But it is clear that the sphere of social responsibility of these corporations, whether voluntary or induced, have had some small impact. It is feared that disinvestment will terminate many of these social responsibility projects.
There is a perception in the minds of many Americans that it is only U.S. companies that are disinvesting in South Africa, while European organizations have not been as quick as U.S. corporations to divest However, latest reports indicate that there' is mounting pressure in Europe for disengagement. The impact of a European withdrawal from South Africa will be much greater than a U.S. pull out. Out of the 400 000 Blacks employed in foreign corporations, some 350000 work for European owned corporations. GM, employing about 4000 workers, is arguably the largest U.S. employer, although there are at least 20
European employers who each employ more. (See Tables I and II .) The
British have the largest involvement in terms of total workers employed.
European governments have codes similar to the Sullivan Principles, as do other nations. The European Community Code, the Canadian, Japanese and Australian codes, are all as stringent as the Sullivan Principles. But it appears that European governments are still debating whether a total withdrawal is in the interest of the Black community or not
Sanctions, divestment and disinvestment
When talking about sanctions, it is necessary first to understand the meaning of the terms that are used before we can clearly evaluate their impact. In practical terms, "sanctions" refer to government trade and investment restrictions against South Africa.
Broadly, it includes stoppage of various governmental sales or purchases to and from the country. However, in the context of the current situation in South Africa, the term sanctions appears to be broadly used to include both divestment and disinvestment Journals, in fact, tend to use these terms interchangeably when evaluating their impact.
"Divestment" refers to the sale of ownership rights through the sale of stocks/bonds, in corporations in South Africa, by individuals, cities, schools, states, governments and other institutions.
"Disinvestment" refers to the outright sale of foreign owned businesses in South Africa. The sale could be to local businessmen, Africa, the term sanctions shall include divestment and disinvestment activity.
The United States has been the most active in divestment activity, much of it due to public pressure. By early 1987, about 21 states in the U.S. had adopted divestment policies (see Table III Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Oliver Tambo, leader of the African National Congress, in Tokyo on March 20, 1987, Japanese officials indicated that Japan does not favour comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. The spokesman said that the Japanese government believes that the people of South Africa would suffer, rather than the government if sanctions were imposed.
The point of the above discussion is that if this European trend of divestment continues, it will weigh more heavily on the South
African government than a solely U.S. departure. A U.S. pullout is, at best, a limited effort that will have very little direct impact, although it's indirect effect in terms of publicity could be potentially greater. But the European pullout could have a larger impact, if
we keep in mind that at least 60% of South Africa's foreign investment comes from Europe. In the early 1980s European banks lent more than a billion dollars in loans to South Africa. These organizations employ more than 350 000 Black workers, out of an approximate total of 400000 Black workers employed by foreign corporations. Consequently, apart from having a detrimental effect on Black unemployment, a U.S. corporate departure would probably have very little potential to have a lasting impact on the political economy of South Africa.
Effects of sanctions on Blacks
What has been the real impact of sanctions on the Blacks in South Africa? Much of the evidence of the impact on Blacks cannot be expressed in quantitative terms. Consequently, we have to depend largely on mixed and anecdotal evidence. In addition, die fact that sanctions are detrimental to Blacks itself is a moot point since (hey are designed to be that way. The key question here is not whether sanctions are detrimental, but whether Blacks perceive a benefit from their imposition. In other words, does it hurt the Whites? Or, does it hurt the Blacks more?
First, it is clear that with sanctions and divestment, much of the social responsibility expenditures generated by Sullivan adherents will be curtailed. Schools will lack funds and without the support of U.S. and other companies, community health projects designed for the social and educational emancipation of Blacks in South Africa will come to a halt.
Second, divestment by definition implies a sale to a locally owned company. The question here is whether locally owned organizations will continue the social overhead costs hitherto pledged by foreign organizations. The answer, at best, seems to be that they will not. There is evidence to indicate that when local organizations take control of companies sold by foreign corporations, they do not necessarily adhere to the Sullivan Principles. Lionel Grewan, Executive Director of the Sullivan Signatory Association, notes that the history of divestment is that as soon as a company becomes wholly South African owned, it tends to cut its links with the Sullivan Principles. More organizations have been sold to White South African groups rather than Black South Africans. Divestment, when it is divestment to Black political-economic empowerment would be good, but when it is to White South Africans, then it loses much of the meaning and intention of economic sanctions against South Africa. A report by Eric Wiggin indicates that observers will terminate their Sullivan social responsibility projects for education, community improvement and social justice.
One notable exception to selling organizations to White South Africans is the proposed example of Ford Motor Company, where the automaker is holding discussions with labor and community leaders regarding its 62% stake in Samcor (South African Motor Corporation), the giant South African conglomerate. Ford is basically seeking an alternative to a complete pull out, which will harm the employees, 70% of whom are Black Ford is seriously exploring the question of whether its stake can be turned over to its employees. At the annual general meeting, Chairman Donald Peterson pointed out that total withdrawal would result in the closure of Samcor and the loss of 16000 related jobs. The shareholders of Ford voted against total withdrawal. The logical solution, according to Ford officials, appears to be to transfer its holdings to Samcor employees. Labor and community leaders are still debating the idea.
There is much cause for concern from unions on this issue. The union is concerned that once Ford loosens its ties, Samcor may have difficulty competing in South Africa's overcrowded auto industry. It also questions whether the company would pay sufficient dividends to make the share holdings worthwhile. Instead, the union prefers longer term compensation and assurances that pensions will still be honored.
The auto workers, a part of the National Union of Metalworkers, are understandably sensitive to disinvestment moves. However, when American companies sell their subsidiaries, they often arrange to supply their parts or products to the new owners.
According to the Massachusetts based Mitchell Investment Management, 35% of the 106 U.S. subsidiaries sold in the last two years continue to sell their goods, through licensing, distribution, franchising or trademark agreements. 13 According to a spokesman of Mitchell Investment, firms still manage to make a profit, without the expenses of direct involvement, and consequently, many of the companies that said they were pulling out really were not. Blacks will be able to sustain the hardship that is required. Denis Huxley, the Catholic Archbishop of Durban, predicts that sanctions and divestments, and the resulting hardships faced by Blacks would precipitate conflicts that could go on for twenty years, and end in total devastation of the country. Other opinion leaders tend to support this view. Alan Paton, the author of the internationally acclaimed book Cry the Beloved Country, also indicates that sanctions, if they have the effect of putting a man out of work, is disastrous.
Chris Dlamini, a vice president of one of South Africa's more radical trade unions, supports sanctions in principle, but is totally opposed to disinvestment He advocates that the disinvestment oriented organizations should discuss with Black labor a way to arrive at a solution that will help the Blacks, rather than disinvesting to satisfy public opinion in their own countries. Interviews with numerous Black workers also indicate their disillusionment with sanctions. Goodwill Mpizi, a Black worker in the Eastern Cape Province seaport of East London, who has been out of a job for ten months, indicates that the mood of the people is changing. "Many of us are hungry, and we hurt when we see our families not eating. People are beginning to steal from each other and fight each other instead of fighting the government" 23 . An additional factor contributing to the ill effects of sanctions is the fact that South Africa's economy was hurt by a four year recession even before the anti-apartheid sanctions campaign began.
Consequently, in a nutshell, the real trouble with sanctions as a political weapon is that it hurts the Blacks more than the Whites.
The effect of sanctions on the economy
According to Standard Bank's and Liberty Life's latest economic, reviews, there is a gradual economic recovery in South Africa in 1987. The Liberty review believes that a 3% growth in Gross Domestic Product is attainable. Supporting this view is an expected moderate rise in private consumption expenditure due to: (a) higher projected revenue from gold and other metals; (b) improved agricultural crop sales; (c) Civil servant pay increases; and (d) fiscal stimulus possibly from a reduction in taxes. The Standard Review also cited as encouraging, the consistent upward movement of exports, retail sales and manufacturing production, good rains, and a healthier gold price and exchange rate, in recent months. A caveat about inflation was also issued. Activity in the foreign exchange market has contributed to a stronger rand. There was almost a 40% increase in diamond sales in 1986 over 1985, and the central selling organization says this increase results from the continued strong demand for both rough and polished stones, in the second case, particularly for larger quality gems.
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The above paragraph was put together from various news reports during January 1987 in South Africa. As is evident, no talk about the effects of economic sanctions is mentioned. This description implies that economic sanctions have had practically no effect in general on the South African economy. However, considering the extensive news coverage given to the imposition of economic sanctions and divestment by various organizations, we would expect the South African economy to be reeling under an economic disaster. What are some of the reasons why sanctions do not appear to have had any effect? This section seeks to explore those reasons.
First, disinvestment has made South African corporations, organizations and managers richer. This has happened because foreign corporations have had to sell their organizations, frequently to incumbent managers, but more often to South African conglomerates, at very low prices. For example, Anglo American Corporation, one of South Africa's 5 large conglomerates that dominate the South African economy, acquired South Africa's largest bank, Barclay's National, from its British parent organization. Anglo paid about $8.06
for stock trading at $10.30. Through this purchase South Africa will save more than 30 million Rand ($14 million) in foreign dividend payments annually. Divestment has also been a boon to the South African Government Industrial Complex. Allied Techonics Corp (AL-TRON) acquired ITT (SA) from the U.S. company. In addition, in the last few years, it has also acquired a string of other foreign organizations' subsidiaries, from the U.S., Britain, France and Holland, including Motorola and Asea. Such activity has increased the economic strength and power of local White owned corporations. In addition, when freed from foreign ownership they gain the ability to bid on defense and government contracts and can also cut out the costly social responsibility programs implemented by foreign owners in conformity with Sullivan and other principles. Five large White owned conglomerates control most of the economic activity in South Africa, and these are the organizations that have grown fastest consequent to divestments.
Second, and by far the most important reason why sanctions cannot have any major effect, is due to South Africa's sophisticated industrial base and vast mineral resources. Almost 60% of its export earnings are from low volume, high value, difficult to sanction items like precious metals, diamonds, and strategic minerals. In addition, South Africa is one of the most self sufficient economies in the world. It can generate almost all its annual capital needs internally, and it actually sustained a net outflow of long term capital after 1976 until the government imposed a debt moratorium in mid-1985. If sanctions are having any effect at all it is in that it is forcing South Africa to reorient itself towards increased import substitution. If necessary, at a price, South Africa has the technical capacity to build anything. They are reasonably self-sufficient in oil through oil from coal plants that provide 70% of their liquid fuel needs. They also produce their own armaments, and actually export arms to 23 countries.
South African businesses are easily exporting all kinds of sanctionable goods to all parts of the world. Despite sanctions, Far Eastern markets and the Soviet Bloc are expected to remain accessible. Coal exports remain steady at about 40 million tons despite decreased demand due to the French and Danish embargoes. Steel is also increasingly exported to the Far East Besides, Africa itself is a large customer for South African products. South Africa's tremendous mineral wealth ensures that it has many products that the world sorely needs, (see Table IV ).
The rising price of gold is rejuvenating the South African economy. 25 The economy, it is said, lives and dies by the price of gold.
However, the demand for gold is a relatively stable phenomenon. For a country facing tight credit restrictions from its international lenden, and various economic sanctions, this is quite a luxury.
A report published by the U.S. Geological Survey highlights South Africa's global dominance as a source of platinum group metals.
According to forecasts made, there will be an upsurge in the demand for platinum in Europe, for use in devices for cutting lead in petrol as anti-pollution measures from the next year. The fuel emission standards of the U.S. have spread to Europe, and worldwide consumption of platinum is expected to increase. The study highlighted the extent of the world's reliance on the platinum group metals, i.e. platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium and osmium. South Africa has 72% of the world's known and economically mineable platinum with the Soviet Union having 26%. The balance 2% is shared between the U.S.
and Canada (see Tables V and VI) .
Consequently, South Africa has a position of leverage in the world's mineral markets that makes it extremely difficult for most countries to cut off all des with South Africa. Gold and other precious metals bring in about 75% of South Africa's foreign exchange earnings and contribute 20% to its Gross Domestic Product Gold, therefore, and platinum are unlikely targets of sanctions. The mineral dependence of the U.S. on South Africa is considerable. As a result, these minerals become unsanctionable items (see Table VII . 26 The recent instability of the Suez Canal due to unrest in the Middle East has increased the importance of the Cape sea route. By that route comes 80% of European NATO's oil consumption, 80% of its strategic minerals and 25% of its food requirements.
These factors, therefore, raise no surprise why sanctions are ineffective. The imposition of sanctions could have several other effects also on the political processes. Experts estimate that the increased isolation of South Africa from the rest of the world will force the Whites more to the right, and increase their resistance to attempts to eradicate apartheid. In addition, these sanctions are forcing South Africa to become increasingly self sufficient. The more it does so, the less is the ability of foreign governments to pressure the South African government With fewer foreign firms and fewer capital imports, the South African economy will grow more slowly than otherwise, and that is the extent to which current sanctions may effect The Forbes report 27 estimates that instead of growing at the rate of 5% to 6% a year, it will grow at the rate of 3% a year. But the fact remains that the economy will still grow.
Consequently, sanctions do not solve the problem of acting as an economic force to bring about political change. It has not had any success in bringing about any major economic impact on the economy. In the final analysis, it has hurt Blacks more than Whites.
Having already imposed the sanctions, divested or disinvested, the U.S. no longer has much influence in South Africa.
The effects of sanctions on Southern Africa
The imposition of sanctions on South Africa has also one major and very unpleasant side effect and that is die impact on the economies of the countries in Southern Africa. Table IX for registered foreign workers in South Africa. As many or more workers work there illegally.
For every wage earning job in Lesotho, six jobs in South Africa are filled by workers from Lesotho and the corresponding ratio for Botswana is 3:2 and for Swaziland 2:1. In 1984 Black miners working in South Africa took home to neighboring countries more than $400 million in remittances and deferred pay 29 . This is only from Black miners, and represents a substantial injection of revenues into the economies of these developing countries. Further injections come from the contributions from the Customs Union with South Africa. (70% of Lesotho's government revenue is from this source.) Many plants and factories in these neighboring countries sell goods only to South Africa. It is to be borne in mind that 12% of Mozambique's GNP is earned by Mocambicans working in South African gold mines. Consequently it is clear that in deciding about sanctions against South Africa, countries must also assess the impact on Southern Africa.
When talking about sanctions, it may be pertinent to remember the lesson of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). International sanctions were enforced against Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. Despite these sanctions, Rhodesia was known to have traded with as many as 60 countries. Sanctions led to the development in Rhodesia of a more dynamic business community, a greater diversification in agriculture, the development of import substituting industries and a steady rise in the living standards of the white community without a corresponding increase in living standard of the Blacks. Rhodesia's natural resources were miniscule compared to those of South Africa. Their transport and communication network had hardly developed. The sanctions and the lesson of Rhodesia is relevant to the South African situation today. Against that background, the effect of the imposition of international sanctions against South Africa will be disastrous for the countries of Southern Africa and at best will have only a marginal impact on South Africa itself
Conclusion
When one looks at U.S. involvement in South Africa, two factors emerge rather clearly. One is that the Sullivan Principles, although deemed to be ineffective in dismantling apartheid, did have some positive impact on the economic and social status of Blacks. Total withdrawal, on the other hand, has had a disastrous impact on the Blacks, in terms of reductions in Black employment, and social welfare programs in the areas of education, welfare, health and training. Furthermore, the imposition of economic sanctions and disinvestment has, if anything, only strengthened the economic power of the Whites, and perhaps increased their determination to keep apartheid.
In view of this, it would seem that any change in apartheid must come from within South Africa itself. Indications are that the process has already begun in South Africa. The dramatic announcement by the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church (which provides the religious ideology to bind the system together), that its policy of desegregation was a mistake, is liable to hasten the process of change considerably. Consequently, U.S. policy on South Africa needs to be reconsidered, and reoriented in terms of how the U.S. can
